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Abstract
Can a group be an orthodox rational agent? This requires the group’s aggregate pref-
erences to follow expected utility (static rationality) and to evolve by Bayesian up-
dating (dynamic rationality). Group rationality is possible, but the only preference
aggregation rules which achieve it (and are minimally Paretian and continuous) are the
linear-geometric rules, which combine individual values linearly and individual beliefs
geometrically. Linear-geometric preference aggregation contrasts with classic linear-
linear preference aggregation, which combines both values and beliefs linearly, and
achieves only static rationality. Our characterisation of linear-geometric preference ag-
gregation implies as corollaries a characterisation of linear value aggregation (Harsanyi’s
Theorem) and a characterisation of geometric belief aggregation.
Keywords: rational group agent, uncertainty, preference aggregation, opinion pooling,
static versus dynamic rationality, expected-utility hypothesis, Bayesianism, group ra-
tionality versus Paretianism, spurious unanimity, ex-ante versus ex-post Pareto
JEL classification codes: D7, D8
1 Introduction
Economics and other social sciences work with a well-established paradigm of a rational
agent. They routinely apply this paradigm to group agents such as households, firms,
governments, or entire societies. Such group agents are taken to hold and revise pref-
erences and beliefs, to make decisions, form and revise plans, engage in interactions,
compete on markets, or entertain international relations — in just the same rational way
as individuals. But is a rational group agent actually possible and meaningful, given
heterogeneous (rational) group members? That is, could a rational group agent emerge
from combining conflicting attitudes of group members?
1 I dedicate this work to the memory of Philippe Mongin, co-author and friend (1950—2020). The
paper has benefited from generous feedback by Jean Baccelli, Marcus Pivato, Martin Rechenauer, and
anonymous referees. An earlier version was titled ‘The Rational Group’. The research was supported by
the French National Research Agency through three grants (ANR-17-CE26-0003, ANR-16-FRAL-0010
and ANR-17-EURE-0001).
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This problem matters for two very different reasons. Firstly, it matters to have
aggregation-theoretic micro-foundations for the hypothesis of rational groups, so as to
legitimize the standard modelling practice of invoking rational groups without model-
ling group members. This ‘macroscopic’ modelling practice is useful and fruitful, but
it would be comforting, to say the least, if group agents could be construed as aggrega-
tions of (unmodelled) group members.3 Secondly, one is sometimes explicitly interested
in group members, and seeks to combine their attitudes into rational group attitudes,
for instance in order to determine ‘fair’ group choices, carried out by a group repres-
entative or ‘planner’. This goal is constructive: one seeks to build a rational group
agent out of group members, rather than postulating a rational group agent without
modelling (or knowing) group members.
Existing aggregation theories provide powerful results that take us some way to-
wards a rational group. But they have never aimed for a full-fledged rational group
agent, to the best of my knowledge. For instance, Arrovian preference aggregation
ignores uncertainty, while Bayesian preference aggregation captures uncertainty, but so
far ignores the group’s response to information. Our question is therefore alive: can a
group be a standard rational agent?
The theory of Bayesian preference aggregation offers the right conceptual and formal
tools for addressing our question. This theory seeks to combine individual expected-
utility preferences under uncertainty. What does it already teach us? If group members
have identical beliefs, combining their expected-utility preferences is perfectly possible,
but the Pareto principle implies that group utility must be a linear combination of
individual utilities, by Harsanyi’s Theorem (Harsanyi 1955). The picture changes un-
der heterogeneous beliefs: one can then no longer construct any group expected-utility
preferences which meet the Pareto principle (Mongin 1995). Is this already the end of
group rationality under uncertainty? No. Following Mongin (1997/2016), the Pareto
principle is normatively questionable, because a unanimity can by ‘spurious’: it can rest
on conflicting beliefs, and thereby lose its normative force. For example, citizens could
unanimously want their state to exit a multi-state union, based on conflicting beliefs:
some believe that independence opens their state to the wider world (a consequence
they most prefer), while others believe that independence isolates their state (a con-
sequence they most prefer). Taking up this challenge, Gilboa, Samet and Schmeidler
(2004) (‘GSS’) propose to restrict the Pareto condition to comparisons between op-
tions whose consequences depend only on uncontroversial beliefs, and prove a seminal
possibility theorem: the restricted Pareto principle allows the formation of aggregate
expected-utility preferences, but only by defining group utility as a linear combination of
individual utilities and defining group probability as a linear combination of individual
probabilities. I call such preference aggregation linear-linear. Further developments
are discussed in Section 6.
GSS’s linear-linear approach has two shortcomings. First, it does not make the
3What I call aggregation-theoretic (micro-)foundations of group agents differs from so-called game-
theoretic (micro-)foundations of cooperation. In one case, we assume there is a single actor, the ‘group
agent’ (or individual acting on its behalf), whose acts or attitudes we aim to explain or make sense
of in terms of aggregation. In the other case, we assume that all group members are agents, whose
cooperative actions we aim to explain in terms of individual rationality.
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group fully rational, as explained shortly. Second, it relies on a Pareto axiom that
is still vulnerable to indirectly spurious unanimities, i.e., unanimities that depend on
beliefs that depend on conflicting beliefs, a problem explained in Section 3 (and identified
similarly by Mongin and Pivato 2020). Fixing both problems will lead us to linear-
geometric aggregation: values are combined linearly, but beliefs geometrically.
How are linear-linear groups irrational? Any complete theory of rationality im-
poses static and dynamic requirements. Orthodox rational-choice theory is Bayesian;
it imposes the static requirement to hold expected-utility preferences and the dynamic
requirement to revise preferences by applying Bayesian updating to underlying be-
liefs.4 Despite its name, Bayesian preference aggregation theory has so far pursued
only a ‘semi-Bayesian’ or ‘semi-rational’ agenda, by imposing only static rationality on
the group agent, not dynamic rationality. That is, the group agent should maximise
expected utility, but need not revise à la Bayes. The theory is simply silent on the
group’s revision policy; it does nothing to discipline revision. Bayesian updating is
however a cornerstone of classic rationality. A household or other group which updates
its preferences irrationally conflicts with our models, and with our paradigm of ‘rational
households’ and, more generally, ‘rational group agents’. Such a group agent displays
dynamically incoherent behaviour, and runs into the very same well-known problems
and paradoxes as dynamically incoherent individuals. It suffers preference reversals
during dynamic decision problems and games. It can no longer form and execute stable
plans, jeopardizing intertemporal budget planning. It becomes vulnerable to Dutch
books, i.e., engages in sequential betting behaviour that leads to sure loss. So it can
be exploited — by third parties or even group members. In line with the semi-rational
agenda, linear-linear preference aggregation creates a group agent that is statically ra-
tional, but dynamically irrational, as has been complained (e.g., Mongin and Pivato
2020).
How else must preferences be aggregated in order to make the group rational? This
natural question has remained open. Why? One reason could be that full group ra-
tionality seems at first like an unreachable goal, since already static group rationality
is so hard to reach. Another reason surely is that the literature predominantly ad-
opts a single-profile approach, i.e., works with a fixed profile of individual preferences
and fixed group preferences, instead of adopting a multi-profile approach, i.e., working
with a domain of possible profiles and an aggregation function defined on this domain
(a notable exception is Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark 2008). The single-profile
4Originally, and for most philosophers, Bayesianism is a theory of (rational) beliefs rather than
preferences, imposing the static requirement to hold beliefs in probabilistic form (‘probabilism’) and the
dynamic requirement to revise beliefs by Bayesian updating (‘conditionalisation’); see Joyce (2011) and
Bradley (2017). Standing in a behaviourist tradition, the economic discipline has recast Bayesianism
as a theory of preferences, by recasting the static requirement as the requirement that preferences
follow expected utilities, and recasting the dynamic requirement as the requirement that preferences be
revised by applying Bayesian updating to underlying beliefs whilst never modifying underlying values
(utilities). Also outside the Bayesian world, rationality usually has a static and a dynamic component.
In particular, many logical theories of rational beliefs impose the static requirement to hold consistent
and deductively closed binary beliefs, and the dynamic requirement to revise those beliefs according
to certain belief-revision axioms, e.g., the ‘AGM postulates’ (Alchourron et al. 1985). Also John
Broome’s influential philosophical theory of rationality and reasoning takes rationality to impose static
and dynamic requirements; see Broome (2013) and Dietrich et al. (2019).
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approach makes preference change unaddressable, since the profile cannot be trans-
formed. To study dynamic rationality, we therefore adopt a multi-profile approach,
which is common elsewhere in social choice theory.5
This paper contributes the following theorem: only linear-geometric preference ag-
gregation creates a rational group agent, assuming the group agent depends on group
members in a minimally Paretian (and continuous) way. Minimal Paretianism weakens
GSS’s Pareto condition further, by restricting the condition to situations (profiles) with
common beliefs on all events, not just on events on which the two acts under compar-
ison depend. Minimal Paretianism is no longer vulnerable to any spurious unanimities,
be they direct or indirect; this addresses the mentioned problem with GSS’s Pareto
axiom.
A first lesson is that full group rationality is non-trivially possible. This supports
the standard modelling hypothesis of rational group agents. Another lesson is that
group rationality requires combining beliefs non-classically (i.e., geometrically), but
combining values classically (i.e., linearly).
Section 2 gives an example. Sections 3—6 present the theorem, its corollaries and
generalisations, and a critical assessment of the findings and their relation to the liter-
ature. Proofs are given in the appendix.
2 Illustration of group-preference change
We reconsider GSS’s classic story, but in a dynamic variant. The story is pure fiction,
but its structure is typical for real group agents. The group consists of two gentlemen
1 and 2. They have a dispute and must decide whether to fight a duel. The outcome
of a duel is either that 1 wins (and 2 loses) or that 2 wins (and 1 loses), depending on
a state of nature. There are three states:
• in state 1, 1 is stronger than 2, so would win a duel.
• in state 2, 2 is stronger than 1, so would win a duel.
• in state 3, 2 has a superior weapon (and is equally strong), so would win a duel.
In all states, having no duel has the outcome that nobody wins. Both gentlemen are
fully rational: they hold expected-utility (‘EU’) preferences and update them via Bayes’
rule. We consider two time points: before and after learning the event  = {1 2}
that 2 does not have a superior weapon. Table 1 displays the gentlemen’s utilities of
both outcomes of a duel, the probabilities of states, and the expected utilities of a
duel, before and after learning . Note different things. Each gentleman most prefers
winning himself (utility 1). While gentleman 1 fears dying (utility −5), the reckless and
honour-obsessed gentleman 2 does not mind dying (utility 0). Each gentleman initially
believes strongly that he would win a duel, and updates his probabilities rationally via
Bayes’ rule. At each moment, the gentlemen have conflicting utilities and conflicting
beliefs, yet unanimously prefer duelling, as duelling gives positive expected utility while
not duelling gives zero expected utility.
5Although a multi-profile setting is not explicitly dynamic (since time is absent), it implicitly opens
the door to a dynamic analysis, because one can represent the effect of new information on individual
preferences, hence on the profile, and thus on aggregate preferences of the group agent.
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utility of old prob. of old EU new prob. of new EU
1 wins 2 wins 1 2 3 of duel 1 2 3 of dual
gentleman 1 1 -5 .85 .05 .1 .1 .94 .06 0 .67
gentleman 2 0 1 .15 .15 .7 .85 .5 .5 0 .5
linear-linear group .5 -2 .5 .1 .4 —.75 .72 .28 0 —.19
linear-geometric group .5 -2 .51 .12 .37 —.74 .80 .20 0 .01
Table 1: Values, beliefs, and expected values before and after learning the event  =
{1 2} (numbers are rounded to two decimal digits)
Table 1 also displays group utilities, probabilities, and expected utilities, under two
alternative aggregation rules for forming group EU preferences:
• The linear-linear rule defines group utility as the (unweighted) linear average of
individual utilities; and similarly for group probability.
• The linear-geometric rule defines group utility as the (unweighted) linear average
of individual utilities; but it defines group probability as the (unweighted) geo-
metric average of individual probabilities, normalised to a probability function.
For instance, the old group probability of 3 is (1)
5(7)5 ≈ 037, where  is the
normalisation factor 1[(85)5(15)5 + (05)5(15)5 + (1)5(7)5].
Under both rules, not duelling is initially collectively better than duelling — against the
gentlemen’s unanimous preference. Such Pareto violations have been at the heart of
Bayesian aggregation theory, but this paper instead asks whether the group updates
its preferences rationally. This is not the case under the linear-linear rule: according to






≈ 17 rather than 72 and 28, and the new group expected utility of duelling




(−2) ≈ 08 rather than −019. So the group should
have come to prefer duelling. By contrast, under the linear-geometric rule the new
group probabilities and expected utility in Table 1 arise from the old ones via Bayes’
rule, as one can check and as our theorem will imply generally. As the new expected
utility of duelling is 01  0, the information makes duelling collectively superior (in
our fictional setting which ignores the unacceptability of duels).
The dynamic rationality of linear-linear aggregation cannot be restored by using
weighted linear averages and allowing weights to depend on the preference profile, hence
on information states.6
3 Characterisation of fully rational aggregation
We consider a group of individuals  = {1     } ( ≥ 2). I work in the Anscombe-
Aumann framework.7 So let  be a finite set  of outcomes (|| ≥ 2), and X the set
of lotteries, i.e., probability functions over , capturing objective risk (and defined on
6Such ‘linear-linear rules with variable weights’ still violate Bayes’ rule, except if beliefs are combined
dictatorially by concentrating all weight on some individual.
7By working in the Anscombe-Aumann framework, we depart from Mongin (1995) and GSS (2004),
who work in the Savage framework, and come closer to Harsanyi (1954), who works in the von-Neumann-
Neumann framework, a special case of the Anscombe-Aumann framework (i.e., the single-state case).
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the power set 2). The probability of an outcome  under a lottery  is () = ({}).
A utility function is a function  :  → R, representing values. It is normalised if
minimal utility is min∈ () = 0 and maximal utility is max∈ () = 1. As usual,
it is extended to lotteries by taking expectations: () := E() for lotteries  ∈ X .
Turning to subjective uncertainty, let  be a non-empty finite set of states. Sets of
states are events. We allow the single-state case || = 1, but exclude the two-state case
|| = 2, in which our theorem curiously does not hold.8
Choice options are functions  :  → X (‘acts’), representing the prospect of lottery
() in state . I use similar symbols for acts and lotteries (‘’, ‘’, ...), because lotteries
are identifiable with special acts: constant acts, containing no subjective uncertainty.
A preference relation is a binary relation º over acts, formally º ⊆ X  × X ; we
write Â for its asymmetric component (representing strict preference) and ∼ for its
symmetric component (representing indifference). A state or event is null under º if
the outcome in it is irrelevant, i.e., all acts that agree outside it are indifferent.
A preference relation º is of expected-utility type — ‘is EU’ — if it maximises some
expected-utility function, i.e., there are a non-constant utility function  :  → R and
a probability function  on 2 such that
 º ⇔ E(()) ≥ E(()) for all acts   ∈ X 
Here,  is unique, and  is unique if one imposes normalisation. The unique  and
normalised  are denoted º and º, respectively. Let P be the set of EU preference
relations.
A value profile is a vector u = () of normalised utility functions  of individuals
 ∈  , summarising the values of individuals. A belief profile is a vector p = () of
probability functions on the set 2 of events, summarising the beliefs of individuals. An
EU preference profile is a vector (º) ∈ P of EU preference relations; it summarises
the preferences of individuals, and indirectly encodes their values and their beliefs,
contained in the value profile (º) and belief profile (º).
Bayesian aggregation theory usually works with a fixed preference profile. To study
preference change, we take a multi-profile approach: we consider a set of possible profiles
D ⊆ P, the domain. For generality, the theorem will assume little about the domain.
It will assume that D is regular, by which I mean two things. First, each profile (º) ∈ D
is coherent : individuals have mutually consistent beliefs, i.e., at least one state  ∈ 
is non-null under each º ( ∈ ). Coherence is plausible because presumably some
state in  is ‘true’ and hence not excluded by any rational individual.9 Second, to allow
belief revision, D is closed under belief change: whenever D contains a coherent profile
(º) ∈ P, then D also contains each coherent profile (º0) ∈ P that differ from (º)
only in beliefs, not in values.
An EU preference aggregation rule, or simply a rule, is a function transforming
EU preference profiles (from some domain) into group EU preference relations, i.e., a
8 In the two-state case, our axioms are necessary, but no longer sufficient for linear-geometric ag-
gregation, as they for instance permit linear-linear aggregation.
9As nobody can possess conclusive evidence against the truth.
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function  : D→ P on some domain D ⊆ P.10
The following type of rules will emerge from our analysis:
Definition 1 An EU preference aggregation rule  : D → P (D ⊆ P) is linear-
geometric if there exist individual weights  ∈ R and  ∈ R+ ( ∈ ) where
P
  = 1
such that for each preference profile (º) ∈ D the group preference relation º =  ((º))
has
• utility function º given by
P
 º up to an additive constant,
• probability function º given on states by
Q
[º ]
 up to a multiplicative con-
stant.11
Such rules contrast with linear-linear rules, which are defined analogously except
from replacing the second bullet point by:
• probability function º given by º =
P
 º .
I now state simple axioms on a rule  : D → P. The core axiom requires rational
revision of group preferences. Rational revision is revision by conditionalisation. The
conditionalisation of a preference relation º on an event  ⊆  is a new preference re-
lation, denoted º, which can be defined in two equivalent ways. Under one definition,
which assumes that º is EU (and  is non-null), º is the relation obtained from º
by conditionalising beliefs and leaving utilities unchanged, i.e., the unique EU relation
such that º = º(·|) and º = º. The general or abstract definition, due to
Savage, needs no reference to utilities and probabilities: º is the relation such that,
for any acts  , we have  º  if and only if we have 0 º 0 for some acts 0 0
such that (i) in the event , 0 agrees with  and 0 agrees with , and (ii) outside ,
0 agrees with 0. In short,  º  means that  becomes weakly preferred to  after
equalizing (‘ignoring’) outcomes outside . The axiom can now be stated.
Dynamic Rationality (or Bayesian Updating): When information is learnt by
everyone, the new group preferences equal the old ones conditional on the information.
Formally, if a profile (º0) ∈ D arises from another (º) ∈ D by conditionalising pref-
erences on an event  ⊆ , i.e., º0 = º for all , then the new group relation º0
=  ((º0)) arises by conditionalising º =  ((º)) on , i.e., º0 = º.
In short, post-information group preferences must be equal to pre-information group
preferences conditional on information. Violation of this axiommakes the group dynam-
ically irrational and unable to execute stable plans. This may also create opportunities
to manipulate group preferences and decisions through delaying information.
10Our notions of ‘rule’ and ‘domain’ build in the assumption that preferences (individual or collective)
are of EU type, i.e., statically rational. Generalised notions of ‘rule’ and ‘domain’ could drop this
assumption.
11 In the representation of a linear-geometric rule, the belief weights  and the multiplicative constant
are are unique (except in the single-state case || = 1, in which beliefs are trivial). The value weights
 and the additive constant are unique under the diversity condition defined in Section 5. Following
standard convention, 0 = 1 for all  ∈ R+, even for  = 0. This convention allows one to interpret
[º()]
 ( ∈ ) even if for some  and º() are both zero.
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Before defining our own Pareto axiom, recall the standard Pareto (indifference)
axiom:
Standard Pareto: For all profiles (º) ∈ D and acts   ∈ X , if  ∼  for each
 ∈  , then  ∼  (where º =  ((º))).
This axiom is notoriously criticised because unanimous preferences or indifferences
can be spurious: they can rest on conflicting beliefs (Mongin 1997/2016). In the ex-
ample of Section 2, the unanimous preference for duelling is spurious, as the gentlemen
hold (very) different subjective probabilities. GSS have therefore restricted Standard
Pareto to acts that depend only on events of uncontroversial probability. Formally,
given a profile (º), an act  is common-belief-based if all individual probability func-
tions º ( ∈ ) agree on tho events on which  depend, where the events on which 
depend are the events of the form { ∈  : () ∈ } = −1() for some  ⊆ L, i.e., the
events of the form ‘ has such-and-such result’. An act can be common-belief-based
even if beliefs disagree on many events, on which  does not depend.12
Here is GSS’s axiom, translated into our Anscombe-Aumann-type framework:
Restricted Pareto: For all profiles (º) ∈ D and common-belief-based acts   ∈ X ,
if  ∼  for each  ∈  , then  ∼  (where º =  ((º))).
However, this axiom is only safe against ‘direct’ spurious unanimities. I call a un-
animous preference or indifference directly spurious if it is based on conflicting beliefs,
and indirectly spurious if it is based on (possibly unanimous) beliefs that are based
on conflicting beliefs (Mongin and Pivato 2020 draw a related distinction to question
GSS’s axiom). Here is an example of a unanimous preference that is not directly,
but indirectly spurious: a group of individuals unanimously prefers the UK to remain
within the EU based on a unanimous strong belief in the event  that ‘Brexit’ harms
the British economy (and a unanimous concern for the economy), but this belief is
based on conflicting reasons, i.e., conflicting beliefs about epistemically prior events.
Some individuals might strongly believe  because they strongly believe that the gov-
ernmental advisers said so (event 0) and that advisors tell the truth (event 00), while
others strongly believe  because they strongly believe that the governmental advisers
denied  (event 0) and that they are mistaken (event 00). The former individuals
reason from 0 and 00 to  (using 0 ∩ 00 ⊆ ), while the latter individuals reason
from 0 and 00 to  (using 0 ∩00 ⊆ ).
Defining the notion of indirect spuriousness formally would require enriching the
model, presumably by a relation of epistemic priory between events or something that
generates such a relation, because our current model only captures logical relations
between events, from which one cannot generally read off the direction of epistemic
priority or reasoning.13 But for present purposes we need not define indirect spurious-
ness formally. We only aim to state a Pareto axiom that is safe against all spurious
12For instance, even under highly heterogeneous beliefs, all constant acts are common-belief-based,
because such acts depend only on the trivial events  and ∅, on which beliefs must agree.
13For instance, in the example the fact that 0 ∩ 00 ⊆  does not yet establish that someone who
strongly beliefs  0 and 00 has reasoned from 0 and 00 to . The person might instead have come
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unanimities, direct or indirect. Such a safe Pareto axiom is obtained by restricting
the Pareto axiom further, namely to common-belief profiles, i.e., profiles (º) in which
every individual  has same probability function º . In such profiles, not only the
beliefs underlying two given acts are unanimous, but also the beliefs underlying those
beliefs, the beliefs underlying beliefs underlying those beliefs, etc. This automatically
excludes spurious unanimities of any order of indirectness. Here is the new axiom:
Minimal Pareto: For all common-belief profiles (º) ∈ D and acts   ∈ X , if  ∼ 
for each  ∈  , then  ∼  (where º =  ((º))).
Remark 1 Minimal Pareto weakens Restricted Pareto, which weakens Standard Pareto.
Our last axiom requires group preferences to depend continuously on individual
preferences, where ‘convergence’ is defined in the natural way.14
Continuity: If (º1 ) (º2 ) · · ·→ (º) in D, then  ((º1 ))  ((º2 )) · · ·→  ((º)).
I now state the theorem. I do this here only for fixed-values domains, i.e., domains
D whose profiles all have the same value profile; Section 5 re-states the theorem without
fixing values. Fixed-values domains allow variation in beliefs, but not in values. Fixing
values is perhaps not a great loss, as Bayesian learning changes beliefs, not values;
and it is a ‘half-way’ concession to the fixed-profile approach of standard Bayesian
aggregation theory, which fixes values and beliefs.
Theorem 1 An EU preference aggregation rule  : D→ P on a (regular) fixed-values
domain D is dynamically rational, minimally Paretian, and continuous if and only if
it is linear-geometric.
I now discuss two extensions and the special case of ‘no uncertainty’.
Extension 1: non-public information. The axiom of Dynamic Rationality covers
public information (observed by everyone). It can be re-stated in two ways, to cover
private information (observed by just one individual) or to cover semi-private inform-
ation (observed by at least one individual). These are the two modified axioms, where
I underline the changes from the original:
• Dynamic Rationality for Private [or: Semi-private] Learning : When information
is learnt by exactly [or: at least] one individual, the new group preferences equal
the old ones conditional on the information. Formally, if a profile (º0) ∈ D arises
up independently with the three beliefs (without any epistemic priorities between these events), or have
reasoned from  and some further event  to 0 and 00 using that  ∩  ⊆ 0 and  ∩  ⊆ 00
(in which case the epistemic priority goes the other way round). This illustrates that logical relations
underdetermine epistemic priority.
14A sequence of relations º1º2 · · · ∈ P converges to º ∈ P — written º1º2 · · ·→ º — if expected
utilities of acts converge: Eº1 (º1())Eº2 (º2()) · · · → Eº(º()) for all acts  ∈ X . This is
equivalent to convergence of values and beliefs: º1  º2  · · ·→ º and º1  º2  · · ·→ º (see Lemma
5). A sequence of profiles (º1 ) (º2 ) · · · ∈ D converges to (º) ∈ D — written (º1 ) (º2 ) · · ·→ (º) —
if º1 º2  · · ·→ º for each individual .
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from another (º) ∈ D by conditionalising the preferences of exactly [or: at least]
one individual on an event  ⊆ , then the new group relation º0 =  ((º0))
arises by conditionalising º =  ((º)) on .
The axiom with semi-private information is obviously logically stronger than the
original axiom. Even the axiom with private information is logically stronger, because
public learning of  can be decomposed into  steps of private learning of  by each
individual in turn, assuming the domain D is regular (to ensure the profile stays in D
in each step). These stronger axioms can still be met, by only slightly fewer rules. We
must only exclude rules that ignore someone’s beliefs, to avoid that private learning by
someone is collectively ignored. More precisely, Theorem 1 still holds if we strengthen
Dynamic Rationality in one of the two ways (no matter which) and require strict
positivity of the belief weights  ( ∈ ).
Extension 2: respecting individual values. Theorem 1 imposes no constraints on
the sign of the value weights . Individual values could be ignored ( = 0) or even
counted negatively (  0). We can enforce non-negativity or even positivity of the
value weights  by strengthening the Minimal Pareto axiom in Theorem 1 in natural
ways. To enforce non-negativity, replace the axiom’s indifferences by weak preferences.
To enforce positivity, do the same and add that the group’s weak preference becomes
strict whenever some individual’s weak preference becomes strict.
Harsanyi’s Theorem as the uncertainty-free special case. Theorem 1 reduces to
Harsanyi’s Theorem in the uncertainty-free case, i.e., the single-state case || = 1. This
is because in that case acts in X  reduce to lotteries in X (which contain no subjective
uncertainty), the domain D becomes singleton (which amounts to fixing the profile),
our Minimal Pareto axiom reduces to Harsanyi’s Pareto indifference axiom, and the
axioms of Dynamic Rationality and Continuity drop out (as they hold trivially for a
single-profile domain). To state Harsanyi’s Theorem, let an EU preference relation on
X (rather than X) be a binary relation º on X which maximises the expectation of
some non-constant utility function  on; the unique normalised version of  is denoted
º. A group preference relation º on X satisfies the Pareto indifference principle w.r.t.
individual preference relations º on X ( ∈ ) if  ∼ 0 whenever  ∼ 0 for all  ∈  .
Corollary (Harsanyi’s Theorem) A group EU preference relation º on X satisfies
the Pareto indifference principle w.r.t. individual EU preference relations º on X
(  ∈ ) if and only if º =
P
 º +  for some  ∈ R (  ∈ ) and  ∈ R.
4 Linear or geometric pooling of beliefs?
Linear-geometric aggregation differs from classical linear-linear aggregation only in how
beliefs are pooled. Should beliefs be pooled linearly or geometrically after all? This
is the notorious debate in opinion pooling theory — a debate that should finally reach
Bayesian preference aggregation theory. Opinion pooling theory is concerned with
merging subjective probabilities, not preferences. It has long recognised that linear
and geometric pooling each have one significant argument in its favour.
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Pro geometric. Geometric belief aggregation has superior dynamic behaviour (see
Section 6 for discussion of the literature). In fact, Theorem 1 implies a new version of
this result, namely a ‘belief analogue’ of Theorem 1:
Theorem 2 A belief aggregation rule (on the domain of coherent belief profiles) is dy-
namically rational, unanimity-preserving, and continuous if and only if it is geometric.
The concepts in Theorem 2 (such as ‘dynamically rational’) are belief-theoretic
counterparts of the preference-theoretic concepts in Theorem 1. The appendix gives
the obvious formal definitions, and proves Theorem 2 by reducing it to a special case
of Theorem 1.
Pro linear. Linear opinion pooling enjoys the following (conditional) robustness prop-
erty: if states are refined or coarsened, then group beliefs are not perturbed, i.e.,
merely ‘extended’ or ‘restricted’, assuming that individual beliefs are not perturbed,
i.e., merely ‘extended’ or ‘restricted’ (a questionable assumption unfortunately, as ex-
plained shortly). This robustness property holds similarly in the context of aggregating
preferences rather than beliefs.
How important is such robustness in the preference-aggregation context? Much
depends on which of the two goals mentioned in the introduction we pursue. Robust-
ness matters less for the methodological goal of knowing whether the social-scientific
hypothesis of ‘rational group agents’ is coherent, i.e., has aggregation-theoretic micro-
foundations. An ideal rational agent holds beliefs defined on fixed, maximally informat-
ive states. This requires a maximal state space , and forbids coarsening states as done
in robustness arguments. Coearsening states applies to non-ideal agents. Robustness
however matters if we aim to construct group preferences in practice. In practice, one
cannot work with the maximally fine states of ideal rational agents. This opens the
door to problems of state design and robustness.
Unfortunately, in practice not even linear pooling is robust, because individual
beliefs are systematically non-robust to start with. Why? The states of a model are
normally linked, at least partly, to the (atomic) scenarios which individuals subjectively
consider, or are aware of, or reason with — either because the design of states (the
‘framing of contingencies’, in Ahn and Ergin’s 2010 words) affects people’s reasoning
and conceptualisation of options, or conversely because people’s reasoning guides the
modeller, who tailors the states of the model to the (atomic) scenarios considered by
individuals. Given this correlation between states and awareness — between model
ontology and individual ontology — a state refinement reflects growing awareness. But
growingly aware individuals do not only extend their old beliefs to new events: they
also revise their beliefs about old events, a process that is rationally governed by a well-
defined revision rule, axiomatised by Ahn and Ergin (2010) as ‘partition-dependence’,
by Karni and Viero (2013, 2020) as ‘reverse Bayesianism’, and by Dietrich (2018) as
‘proportional rescaling’. This makes individual beliefs non-robust. Hence also group
beliefs are non-robust, even if formed linearly.
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5 How stable are the individual weights?
Theorem 1 delivers a type of aggregation in which the impact or ‘say’ of an individual
, given by his pair of weights  and , does not depend on the profile, hence is robust
to belief change: individual weights remain the same when beliefs change. But what
happens to weights when values change? This question is bracketed out by Theorem 1
by assuming a fixed-values domain. To answer the question, I now re-sttate Theorem
1 for domains in which not just beliefs, but also values can change. The finding will be
that individual weights can depend on values, but not on beliefs.
Technically, the extended theorem will make a standard assumption on profiles (be-
cause of which it is, strictly speaking, not logically stronger than Theorem 1). An EU
preference profile (º) is diverse — onr might say, ‘diverse in values’ — if for each indi-
vidual  there are lotteries  0 ∈ X between which only individual  is non-indifferent
(i.e.,  6∼ 0 while  ∼ 0 for  6= ). In the extended theorem, individual weights can
vary with values, in the following sense:
Definition 2 An EU preference aggregation rule  : D → P (D ⊆ P) is linear-
geometric with values-dependent weights if there exist individual weights u ∈ R and
u ∈ R+ ( ∈ ) which depend continuously on the value profile u ∈ {(º) : (º
) ∈ D}, where P u = 1 for each u, such that at each profile (º) ∈ D the group
preference relation º =  ((º)) has
• utility function º given by
P
 uº up to an additive constant,
• probability function º given on states by
Q
[º ]
u up to a multiplicative con-
stant,
where u denotes the current value profile (º).
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Theorem 1+ An EU preference aggregation rule  : D → P on a (regular) do-
main D of diverse profiles is dynamically rational, minimally Paretian, and continuous
if and only if it is linear-geometric with values-dependent weights.
Extensions 1 and 2 translate analogously to Theorem 1+. The domain in Theorem
1+ is flexible. Maximally, it contains all diverse coherent profiles (º) ∈ P. Minimally,
it is a fixed-values domain. Aside from the diversity condition, Theorem 1 is a special
case of Theorem 1+: the case of fixed values. The reason is that by fixing values we
fix the index u in the weights ‘u’ and ‘u’; so this index drops out, and we obtain
ordinary linear-geometric rules.
As individual weights depend only on values, not on beliefs, weights still enjoy a
limited amount of stability or profile-independence. By contrast, the weights in GSS’s
linear-linear result can vary with both values and beliefs, even discontinuously. This full
profile-dependence would become visible if GSS’s result were re-stated as a multi-profile
result, i.e., as a result about an aggregation rule defined on a domain of profiles. The
reason why our fully rational approach leads to more weight stability than GSS’s less
rational and more Paretian approach is that we adopt inter-profile conditions (Dynamic
15Footnote 11 about uniqueness of weights applies analogously.
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Rationality and Continuity), which connect and structure aggregation across profiles.
GSS adopt only intra-profile conditions (static rationality and restricted Pareto), which
cannot prevent the weights from jumping arbitrarily across profiles.
One may conjecture that combining both approaches leads to an impossibility the-
orem: there is no non-degenerate rule that is fully rational and also Paretian in GSS’s
stronger sense. Why? By Theorem 1+, such a rule must be linear-geometric with
values-dependent weights (taking ‘non-degenerate’ to subsume ‘continuous’). On the
other hand, the rule must be linear-linear with profile-dependent weights, assuming
GSS’s theorem translates to our framework, a conjecture whose proof lies outside the
scope of this paper.16 To be both simultaneously, some individual must receive the full
belief weight of one, and this individual must (by continuity) be the same at all profiles.
So the rule must be dictatorial in beliefs, hence degenerate; it can be non-dictatorial
(only) in values, as (only) the value weights can be distributed freely.
6 Discussion in relation to the literature
I have proposed to model groups as fully rational agents, by applying to group agents
what we normally require from individuals. Group rationality is uniquely achieved
by linear-geometric aggregation, if group preferences are minimally Paretian and con-
tinuous in individual preferences. Linear-geometric aggregation makes the group agent
more rational, but less Paretian, than GSS’s classic linear-linear aggregation — a new
instance of the classic trade-off between group rationality and Paretianism (see below).
Which form of Paretianism is justified under uncertainty is an open debate (see below).
Minimal Paretianism seems particularly unobjectionable, as it is safe against directly
and indirectly spurious unanimities.
From here, important questions open up. How about weakening static group ra-
tionality into non-EU directions while preserving Dynamic Rationality, suitably ex-
tended? Such a dynamically (not statically) rational approach would be the dual of
the statically (not dynamically) rational programme of Harsanyi, Mongin, and Gilboa-
Samet-Schmeidler. And how about geometric-geometric rules, which pool even values
geometrically? Such rules remain fully rational, but become radically non-Paretian.
Bayesian preference aggregation theory was born with Harsanyi’s (1955) spectacular
theorem: in groups with heterogeneous preferences under risk, group utility must be lin-
ear in individual utilities if the group is Paretian and EU rational. Harsanyi regarded
his result as an ‘economic derivation’ of philosophical utilitarianism, a controversial
interpretation ever since (Weymark 1991, Fleurbaey and Mongin 2016). Harsanyi’s
Theorem enjoys some robustness within the limited world of objective uncertainty; see
generalisations by Fleurbaey (2009, 2014) and Danan, Gajdos and Tallon (2015). As
mentioned, the picture reverses for heterogeneous beliefs: EU rationality then becomes
16A version of GSS’s theorem within our Anscombe-Aumann and multi-profile framework would
assert that (on a domain of such-and-such type) the linear-linear rules with profile-dependent weights
are the only restrictedly Paretian rules for generating statically rational group preferences, possibly
assuming some non-degeneracy conditions on the rules. Such a result could also be stated in a single-
profile format, unless the result involves a non-degeneracy condition of an inter-profile nature.
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incompatible with Paretianism (e.g., Mongin 1995), and meanwhile Paretianism be-
comes less compelling because unanimities can be spurious (Mongin 1997/2016); but
Gilboa et al. (2004) restore possibility by restricting the Pareto principle to unanimit-
ies that are not (directly) spurious, obtaining linear-linear group preferences. A lively
literature follows, exploring the trade-off between group rationality — in the static EU
sense setting aside Bayes’ rule — and Paretianism. The general direction has been to
combine more or less strong group rationality with more or less strong Paretianism, usu-
ally working within some classical model of choice under uncertainty (see Chateauneuf,
Cohen and Jaffray 2008 for a review).
Some works emphasize impossibility, often by working with non-EU preferences,
i.e., abandoning even static rationality. In particular, Chambers and Hayashi (2006)
show that full Paretianism already conflicts with minimal group rationality, i.e., with
transitive and complete group preferences satisfying Savage’s P3 or Savage’s P4. An-
other threat to preference aggregation comes from individual irrationality: Gajdos,
Tallon and Vergnaud (2008) and Zuber (2016) show that, unless individuals have EU
preferences, group preferences cannot even be mildly rational and Paretian — also if
individuals have identical beliefs.
Other works stress possibility. For instance, Chambers and Hayashi (2006) show
the possibility of state-dependent fully Paretian group preferences (see already Mongin
1998). Another positive result is due to Danan et al. (2016): incomplete preferences
based on imprecise beliefs can be aggregated in a Paretian way.
Over the years, new Pareto principles have been proposed and defended, such
as principles restricted to unanimities that are shared-belief rationalisable (Gilboa,
Samuelson and Schmeidler 2014), principles sensitive to whether acts depend on object-
ive or subjective uncertainties (Mongin and Pivato 2020), and principles restricted to
unanimities that are common knowledge (Nehring 2004, Chambers and Hayashi 2014).
Attempts to make Paretianism immune to spurious unanimities face a general difficulty:
beliefs become empirically underdetermined once we remove the (unfalsifiable) hypo-
thesis of state-independent utility (Karni 1993, Wakker and Zank 1999, Baccelli 2019).
Different possible reactions might be taken in the face of this intriguing underdetermin-
ation diagnosis, such as: becoming more cautious about Pareto axioms out of fearing
hidden spurious unanimities, or on the contrary reverting to full-blown Paretianism
out of rejecting the very notion of belief and spurious unanimity. The former position
could be described as mentalist or realist, the latter position as strongly behaviourist
or instrumentalist. Sprumont (2018) offers such a behaviourist view.
The Dynamic Rationality axiom is a counterpart for preference aggregation of the
classic External Bayesianity axiom in the theory of belief aggregation or ‘opinion pool-
ing’ (Madansky 1964, Bordley 1982, Genest and Zidek 1986, Dietrich and List 2016).
Like our axiom, External Bayesianity requires aggregation to commute with revision;
but it differs firstly in the objects that are aggregated and revised, namely probabilities
rather than preferences, and secondly in the information that is learnt and triggers
revision, namely information given by a likelihood function rather than an event, i.e., a
function mapping each state to (what is interpreted as) the probability or probability-
density of an information conditional on the state. Informally, likelihood functions
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capture information outside the domain (event algebra) relative to which beliefs are
held. If states are weather states, then the information ‘it rains’ is representable by an
event (the set of states in which it rains), hence lies inside the event algebra, whereas
the information ‘the radio forecasts that it rains’ lies outside the event algebra, and
is representable by a likelihood function that takes values near 1 in ‘rainy’ states (in
which this forecast is likely) and values near 0 in ‘sunny’ states (in which this forecast
is unlikely). While events represent the classical information concept in rational choice
theory and Bayesianism, likelihood functions represent an information concept that is
natural in statistics.17 This might explain why opinion pooling theory (a field influenced
by statistics) uses likelihood-function-type information in its External Bayesianity ax-
iom. As is well-known, geometric opinion pooling rules satisfy External Bayesianity,
but are not the only well-behaved rules doing so (e.g., Dietrich and List 2016, Baccelli
and Stewart 2019). Geometric opinion pooling rules become the only well-behaved
solutions if External Bayesianity is re-stated using standard event-type information,
thereby making group beliefs classically Bayesian; this is what is shown by Theorem 2
(and, in a preference-aggregation context, by Theorem 1). This move towards classic-
ally Bayesian group beliefs is already made in recent work on opinion pooling, in which
close variants of Theorem 2 are established (Russell et al. 2015, Dietrich 2019). The
upshot of Theorem 2 compared to its precursors is that it addresses geometric opinion
pooling in the ordinary sense, while the two earlier classically Bayesian results address
a generalised version of geometric pooling, in which the individual weights need not
sum to one.
Just as geometric opinion pooling can be generalised by lifting the constraint on
the sum of weights, so linear-geometric preference aggregation might be generalised by
lifting the constraint on the sum of belief weights. Such preference aggregation would
still be dynamically rational and continuous, but no longer minimally Paretian, since
generalised geometric pooling does not preserve unanimously held probability functions.
A Proof of Theorem 2 on opinion pooling
This appendix provides the formal definitions underlying Theorem 2, and then gives
two proofs of Theorem 2, a (short) proof based on Theorem 1, and an independent
proof. Having also an independent proof is crucial for us, since Theorem 2 will later
serve as a lemma on the way to prove Theorem 1. So, Theorem 2 is both a corollary of,
and a proof step towards, our central result. Theorem 2 and its (independent) proof
17 If the states represent the possible values of the unknown parameter in a statistical model, then
statistical information (‘data’) is representable by a likelihood function, defined as the data’s parameter-
dependent probability (or probability density). Bayesian statistics requires prior beliefs over the pos-
sible parameter values, and revises them when observing data. This revision is equivalent to condition-
alisation on a likelihood function (the one generated by the data), i.e., revision of the type considered in
the External Bayesianity axiom. This is the statistical rationale underlying External Bayesianity and
the likelihood-function-based concept of information. Seen from this perspective, External Bayesianity
is a natural condition in situations where different Bayesian statisticians work together, but disagree
on the prior beliefs over the parameters, and hence must aggregate their prior beliefs into compromise
prior beliefs (on which the statistical analysis is then based). By contrast, the ordinary event-based
concept of information seems more natural from a rational-choice-theoretic perspective.
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are close variants of existing ones in Russell et al. (2015) and Dietrich (2019).18 For
completeness, I still give a self-contained proof here.
The definitions underlying Theorem 2. Theorem 2 needs fewer formal primitives
than Theorem 1: it only needs our (finite non-empty) set of states , not our set of
outcomes. A belief aggregation (or opinion pooling) rule is a function  mapping each
belief profile p = () from some domain D ⊆ ∆() to a group probability function
(p) ∈ ∆(), hence a function  : D → ∆(). The rule is geometric if there exist
weights  ≥ 0 ( ∈ ) of sum one such that, at each belief profile p ∈ D, (p) is
given on states by
Q
[]
 up to a multiplicative constant. The three axioms used in
Theorem 2 are defined as follows:
• Dynamic Rationality (or Bayesian Updating): When information is learnt by
everyone, the new group beliefs equal the old ones conditional on the inform-
ation. Formally, if a belief profile (0) ∈ D arises from another () ∈ D by
conditionalising beliefs on an event  ⊆ , i.e., for all , 0 = (·|) (in par-
ticular ()  0), then the new group belief ((
0
)) arises by conditionalising
(()) on , i.e., ((
0
)) = (())(·|) (in particular (())()  0).
• Unanimity Preservation: (     ) =  for all unanimous belief profiles (  ) ∈
D.
• Continuity: If p → p in D (i.e.,  →  for all  ∈ ), then (p)→ (p).
Finally, a belief profile p ∈ ∆() is coherent if some state has positive probability
under each individual belief, i.e.,
T
 supp() 6= ∅.
Proof of Theorem 2 from Theorem 1. Assume Theorem 1 holds. Fix a (norm-
alised) utility function . Given , each probability measure  ∈ ∆() corresponds
uniquely to an EU preference relation º ∈ P, defined by º =  and º = . Hence,
any belief aggregation rule  : D→ ∆() on some domain D ⊆ ∆() corresponds to
an EU preference aggregation rule on a corresponding comain D ⊆ P. As in Theorem
2, consider a belief aggregation rule  : D→ ∆() on the domain D of coherent belief
profiles, and let  : D→ P be the corresponding EU preference aggregation rule. Since
D consists of all coherent belief profiles, D is a regular fixed-values domain, i.e., a do-
main of the type assumed in Theorem 1 (more precisely, D is the fixed-values domain
w.r.t. the unanimous value profile (  )). The axioms in Theorem 2 reduce to those
in Theorem 1:
(a)  is dynamically rational if and only if  is dynamically rational, essentially
because, as values are fixed, aggregation-revision commutativity for preferences
reduces to aggregation-revision commutativity for underlying beliefs.
(b)  is continuous if and only if  is continuous, essentially because, again as values
are fixed, convergence of preferences reduces to convergence of underlying beliefs
(drawing on Lemma 5 below).
(c)  is unanimity-preserving if and only if  is minimally Paretian. Why? First, if 
18Theorem 2 shares two premises with Russell et al.’s theorem and with Dietrich’s previous theorem
(i.e., Thm. 2 in Dietrich 2019), namely Dynamic Rationality and Continuity. While Theorem 2
characterises geometric pooling, the two precursors characterise generalised geometric pooling, in which
the individual weights need not have sum one.
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is unanimity-preserving, then  is minimally Paretian, because at any common-
belief profile (º) ∈ D the group relation  ((º)) has the same probability func-
tion as all º (by unanimity-preservation) and the same utility function as all
º (namely ), hence is identical to all º, and thus preserves individual indiffer-
ences. Conversely, assume  is minimally Paretian. To show that  is unanimity-
preserving, consider a unanimous belief profile (  ) ∈ D. We fix a state  ∈ 
and show that (  )() = (). Let  be a constant act which at each state
generates the same lottery having an outcome of utility 1 with probability ()
and an outcome of utility 0 with probability 1− (). Let  be an act which at 
has (surely) an outcome of utility 1 and at other states has (surely) an outcome
of utility 0. For each individual,  and  both have expected utility (), hence
are indifferent. So, by minimal Pareto,  and  are collectively indifferent. Since
 ’s collective expected utility is (), so is ’s. Hence the collective probability of
 is ().
Not only do the axioms of both theorems correspond, but also  is linear-geometric
if and only if  is geometric, because linearity in values holds trivially, given that the
group has the same utility function as all individuals. So Theorem 2 reduces to (the
current instance of) Theorem 1. ¥
Direct proof of Theorem 2. Consider a belief aggregation rule  on D = {p ∈
∆() : p is coherent}. The result is trivial if || = 1. So, as || 6= 2, we can assume
without loss of generality that || ≥ 3.
Part 1 (necessity of the axioms). First, let  be geometric, say with weights  ( ∈
). Trivially,  is then unanimity-preserving (using that
P
  = 1) and continuous.
To show dynamic rationality, assume a belief profile (0) ∈ D arises from another
one () ∈ D by conditionalising each  on , i.e., () 6= 0 and 0 = (·|) for
all . We must show that ((0)) arises by conditionalising (()) on , i.e., that (*)
(())() 6= 0 and (**) ((0)) = (())(·|). To show (*), note first that supp(º) ⊇
∩supp() by definition of geometric pooling. So,
supp(º) ∩ ⊇ [∩supp()] ∩ = ∩[supp() ∩] = ∩supp(0) 6= ∅
where the ‘6=’ holds by coherence of (º0). So, supp(º) ∩  6= ∅, implying (*). To





 on states, where each 0
(= (·|)) is itself proportional to  on states in  and zero on other states. So,
((0)) is proportional to
Q
[]
 (hence to (())) on states in  and zero on other
states. This implies (**). Q.e.d.
Part 2 (sufficiency of the axioms). Now assume  satisfies the three axioms. We
prove several claims, the last of which is that  is geometric, as intended.
Claim 1: For all p ∈ D and all   ∈ , p() = p() 6= 0⇒ (p)() = (p)() 6= 0.
Assume p() = p() 6= 0. For non-triviality,  6= . Let  = { }. Let 0 ∈ ∆()
be given by 0() = 0() = 1
2
. Form the unanimous profile p0 = (0     0). Note that
p(·|) = p0. So, by Dynamic Rationality, (p)() 6= 0 and (p)(·|) = (p0). Hence,
as (p0) = 0 by Unanimity-Preservation, (p)(|) = (p)(|) = 1
2
. By implication,
(p)() = (p)() 6= 0. Q.e.d.
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(p)0() . Put  = { }. Note p(·|) = p0(·|). So (p(·|)) = (p0(·|)),





both ratios are well-defined and non-zero because (p)() (p)() (p0)() (p0)() 6=
0 by Dynamic Rationality. Q.e.d.
Claim 3: (xy) = (x)(y) for all xy ∈ (0∞) and pairwise distinct
   ∈ .
Use that for all xy ∈ (0∞) and pairwise distinct    ∈  one can construct a
















Claim 4: All  for  6=  are the same function, to be denoted  .
Let  0  0 ∈  with  6=  and 0 6= 0, and x ∈ (0∞). I must show (x) =
00(x).
















whence (x) = 0(x).
Case 2:  = 0. By an argument analogous to that in Case 1, (x) = 0(x).
Case 3 :  6= 0 and  6= 0. I show (x) = 00(x) by drawing on Cases 1 and 2. If
 6= 0, then (x) = 0(x) = 00(x) If 0 6= , then (x) = 0(x) = 00(x) If
 = 0 and 0 = , then, choosing any  ∈ \{ }, (x) = (x) = (x) = (x)
Q.e.d.
Claim 5: (xy) = (x)(y) for all xy ∈ (0∞), and (1) = 1.
The functional equation holds by Claims 3 and 4. The identity (1) = 1 follows









for all   ∈  and p ∈ D with p()p()À 0.








= (1) = 1. Q.e.d.
Claim 7: There exist 1      ∈ R such that (x) = 11 · · · for all x ∈ (0∞).
The function  : x 7→ ln (((exp)) on R obeys Cauchy’s functional equation
‘(x + y) = (x) + (y)’ by Claim 5 and is continuous by Continuity. So there are
 ∈ R ( ∈ ) such that (x) =
P
  for all x ∈ R (Aczél 1966). Hence,
(x) = exp  ((ln)) = exp
X

 ln = 
1
1 · · · for all x ∈ (0∞).
Claim 8:
T
 supp() ⊆ supp((p)).
We fix an  ∈ T supp() and show  ∈ supp((p)). Consider the event  = {}.
The updated profile p(·|) is still coherent, i.e., in D, so that by Dynamic Rationality
(p(·|)) = (p)(·|), and in particular (p)()  0. So  ∈ supp((p)). Q.e.d.
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Claim 9: Consider the subdomain of full-support profilesD∗ := {p ∈ D : supp() =
 for all  ∈ }. For each p ∈ D∗, (p) is given on states by Q[] up to a multi-
plicative constant.
Let p ∈ D∗. Fix any  ∈ , and define 0 := (p)() and 00 :=Q[()] . We have
0 00  0, because supp((p)) =  as supp((p)) ⊇ T supp() =  by Claim 8. For























Claim 10:  ≥ 0 for all  ∈  and
P
  = 1.
We proceed by contradiction. First, assume
P
  6= 1. Pick any p ∈ D∗ in which
all  are the same  such that () is neither identical for all  ∈  nor 1 at any  ∈ .




  , a contradiction as
P
  6= 1.
Second, assume  ∈  such that   0. Pick  ∈  and a sequence p1p2 · · · ∈ D∗
that converges to a p ∈ D\D∗ which satisfies supp() = \{} and supp() = 
for all  ∈ \{}. By   0 and Claim 9, the sequence (p1) (p2)    converges
to the measure assigning probability 1 to . Meanwhile by Continuity the limit must
be (p). So (p)() = 1, whence supp((p)) = {}. Yet by Claim 8 supp((p)) ⊇T
 supp() = \{}, a contradiction. Q.e.d.
Claim 11:  coincides with the geometric rule with weights ,  ∈  .
Note that the geometric rule in question is well-defined by Claim 10. As  and this
geometric rule are two continuous functions on D which by Claim 9 coincide on the
topologically dense subdomain D∗, the two functions coincide globally. ¥
B Proof of Theorems 1 and 1+ on preference aggregation
I now prove Theorem 1+. Although Theorem 1 about fixed-values domains is not
quite a corollary (as it does not assume diverse profiles), we need no separate proof of
Theorem 1, because in the case of fixed-values domains the proof of Theorem 1+ does
not require diversity.
Assumptions and notation: Fix a regular domain D of diverse profiles, and a rule
 : D → P. By convention, the group relation obtained by aggregating individual
relations is denoted using the same symbol as for individuals, but without individual
index: so  ((º)) is denoted by º,  ((º0)) is denoted by º0, etc. Let U := {(º) :
(º) ∈ D} be the set of occurring values profiles. Let D  ⊆ D be the subdomain
of common-belief profiles in D.
Consider two separate conditions on the rule  :




º up to an additive constant.
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GEO: There exist non-negative weights (u)∈u∈U with
P
 u = 1 for all u ∈ U
such that, at each profile (º) ∈ D, º is given on  by
Q
[]
(º ) up to a
multiplicative constant.
We prove Theorem 1+ by showing four facts, of which the first three establish
sufficiency of the axioms and the fourth establishes necessity of the axioms:
Fact 1: Dynamic Rationality and Minimal Pareto imply LIN.
Fact 2: Dynamic Rationality, Minimal Pareto, and Continuity imply GEO.
Fact 3: LIN, GEO and Continuity imply that the rule is linear-geometric with values-
dependent weights.
Fact 4: All linear-geometric rules with values-dependent weights satisfy Dynamic Ra-
tionality, Minimal Pareto, and Continuity.
B.1 Proof of Fact 1
We start with a technical lemma:
Lemma 1 For all (º) ∈ D,
T
 supp(º) 6= ∅, and if Dynamic Rationality holds thenT
 supp(º) ⊆ supp(º) ⊆
S
 supp(º).
Proof. Let (º) ∈ D. By coherence,
T
 supp(º) 6= ∅. Now assume Dynamic
Rationality. We first show supp(º) ⊆
S
 supp(º). Let  =
S
 supp(º). Clearly,
º = º for all . So by Dynamic Rationality º = º, whence º = º . Thus
supp(º) ⊆ . Second, we consider any  ∈
T
 supp(º) and show  ∈ supp(º).
Consider the event  = {}. The updated profile (º0) := (º) is coherent, hence in
D. So Dynamic Rationality applies, and implies that º0 = º. In particular, º∈ P.
Thus  ∈ supp(º), as otherwise  would be º-null, andº would be the all-indifferent
relation, which lies outside P. ¥
We next prove that Dynamic Rationality implies this familiar axiom:
Independence of Group Values on Individual Beliefs (IGVIB): For all (º
) (º0) ∈ D, if º = º0 for all  ∈  , then º = º0 .
Lemma 2 Dynamic Rationality implies IGVIB.
Proof. Assume Dynamic Rationality. Note that if profiles (º) (º0) ∈ D are ‘Bayes
neighbours’ in the sense that for some  ⊆  we have (º) = (º0) or (º) = (º0),
then by Dynamic Rationality º = º0 or º = º0, and so º = º0 as conditionalisa-
tion preserves values.
Now consider any (º) (º0) ∈ D such that (º) = (º0). By the previous obser-
vation, it suffices to construct a finite sequence of profiles in D starting with (º) and
ending with (º0) such that any two adjacent profiles are Bayes neighbours. To do so,
pick  ∈ T supp(º) and 0 ∈ supp(º0) (via Lemma 1). Let (º1 )     (º5 ) be the
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five profiles such that (º1 ) = (º) and (º5 ) = (º0), and such that (º2 ), (º3 ), (º4 )
have values profiles given by º2 = º3 = º4 = º ( ∈ ) and belief profiles given




0) = 1 ( ∈ ). These profiles belong
to D as D is closed under belief change. To check for Bayes neighbourhood, note that,
for all  ∈  , º1
{} = º2 , º2 = º3{}, º3{0} = º4 , and º4 = º5{0}. ¥
The proof of Fact 1 is completed by two lemmas. The first uses Harsanyi’s Theorem
to show that Minimal Pareto alone implies a much weaker linearity property than LIN,
which is restricted to common-belief profiles and allows weights to depend arbitrarily on
the profile. The second strengthens the linearity conclusion to LIN by adding IGVIB.
Lemma 3 Under Minimal Pareto, there are weights (º) ∈ R across  ∈  and
(º) ∈ D  such that, at each (º) ∈ D , º =
P
 (º)º +  for some
 ∈ R.
Proof. Let (º) ∈ D . Under Minimal Pareto, the restriction of the group
relation to lotteries, º |X , satisfies Harsanyi’s (1955) Pareto indifference condition
w.r.t. the restricted individual relations º |X ( ∈ ). So our linearity conclusion
holds by Harsanyi’s Theorem (Harsanyi 1955). ¥
Lemma 4 IGVIB and Minimal Pareto jointly imply LIN.
Proof. This result follows from Lemma 3, since under IGVIB the linearity conclusion
in Lemma 3 extends to arbitrary profiles (º) ∈ D (since each (º) ∈ D has the same
values profile as some (º0) ∈ D ), where we can take the weights (º) to depend
on (º) only through the values profile (º ). ¥
B.2 Proof of Fact 2
We begin by a simple characterisation of preference convergence:
Lemma 5 A sequence º converges to º in P (i.e., Eº (º())→ Eº(º()) for
all  ∈ X) if and only if º →  and º → º, where ‘→’ denotes pointwise
convergence or (equivalently) uniform convergence.
Proof. Consider º ( = 1 2    ) and º in P. First, if º → º and º → º,















Conversely, assume º→ º. Then º → º since for each  ∈  we can use the
constant act  ≡  to infer º() = Eº (º()) → Eº(º()) = º(). Now
we fix  ∈  and show º() → º(). Pick  0 ∈  such that º() = 1 and
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º(0) = 0, and consider the act  ∈ X  mapping  to  and all other states to 0.
Since º→ º, we have Eº (º())→ Eº(º()), i.e.,
º()º() + (1− º())º(0)→ º()1 + (1− º())0 = º()
Since º()→ º() = 1 and º(0)→ º(0) = 0, we can infer º()→ º(). ¥
Our preference aggregation rule  induces a family of belief aggregation rules u :
D → ∆(), where u ∈ U , defined as follows. Let u ∈ U . D consists of all coherent
belief profiles. For each p ∈ D, form the preference profile (º) ∈ D with values profile
u and belief profile p, then form the group relation º =  ((º)), and let u(p) := º.
The rules u ( ∈ U) inherit from  the three properties defined in Appendix A:
Lemma 6 (a) If  is dynamically rational, then each u (u ∈ U) is dynamically
rational.
(b) If  is minimally Paretian, then each u ( ∈ U) is unanimity-preserving.
(c) If  is continuous, then each u (u ∈ U) is continuous.
Proof. The result is obvious if || = 1, as then there is only one belief aggregation
rule, which is trivially dynamically rational, unanimity-preserving, and continuous.
Now suppose || 6= 1, and u ∈ U .
(a) Let  be dynamically rational. Assume p ∈ D and  ⊆  with p() À 0,
i.e., with a well-defined updated profile p(·|) ∈ D. Let (º) have values profile u
and belief profile p. As p() À 0, each of (º) and (º) is coherent, so in D. By
Dynamic Rationality, º0 = º. Hence, º0 = º(·|), i.e., u(p(·|)) = u(p)(·|).
Q.e.d.
(b) Assume  is minimally Paretian. Let p = (  ) ∈ ∆() be a unanim-
ous belief profile. Let (º) ∈ D be the preference profile with values profile u and
(unanimous) belief profile p. Form º =  ((º)). We fix a state  ∈  and must
show that u(p)() = (), i.e., that º() = (). Pick outcomes   ∈  such that
 Â , i.e., º()  º(). Let  be the act which yields  at  and  on \{}.
Let  be the constant act which at all states yields the lottery () + (1 − ()),
where  () denotes the lottery with sure outcome  (). Then  ∼  for all
 ∈  . So, as (º) is a common-belief profile,  ∼  by Minimal Pareto. Hence,
º()º()+ (1− º())º() = ()º()+ (1− ())º(). As º()  º(), this
implies º() = (). Q.e.d.
(c) Assume  is continuous, and p → p in ∆(). Let (º ) ( = 1 2 ) and (º)
be the preference profiles in D with the belief profiles p and p, respectively, and with
same values profile u. As p → p and u → u, we have (º )→ (º) by Lemma 5. So
º → º by Continuity for  , and thus by Lemma 5 º → º, i.e., u(p)→ u(p).
¥
By this lemma, each of the rules u (u ∈ U) satisfies the premises of Theorem 2,
proved in Appendix A. So, by this theorem, Fact 2 holds.
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B.3 Proof of Fact 3
Assume  : D → P is continuous and satisfies LIN and GEO, say w.r.t. weights
(u)∈u∈U and (u)∈u∈U , respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume
that in the single-state case || = 1 (in which the geometric weights u are arbitrary)
each u ( ∈ ) is constant in u. By LIN, group utility only depends on the values
profile. For each values profile u ∈ U , denote the corresponding normalised group
utility function by u; it equals
P
 u up to an additive constant.
Claim 1 : The mapping u 7→ u on U is continuous.
We assume u → u in U and show u → u. Pick profiles (º ) ∈ D ( = 1 2 )
and (º) ∈ D with identical belief profiles and values profiles u and u, respectively.
By Lemma 5, º→ º for each . Hence, by continuity of  , º→ º. So, again by
Lemma 5, º → º, i.e., u → u. Q.e.d.
Claim 2 : The mapping u 7→ (u) from U to R is continuous.
Let  := ||, and label the outcomes in  by 1     . For each u = () ∈ U ,
we identify u with the column vector (u(1)     u())
 ∈ R×1, which can be
written as uu where:
u :=
⎛⎜⎝ 1(1) · · · (1) 1... ... ...
1() · · · () 1







with u defined as the normalisation constant such that the minimal entry of uu is
zero (so u = −min∈
P
 u1()). Since u = uu, we have 

u u = 

u uu,
where u is the transpose of u. By diversity, the functions u on  ( ∈ ) are
affinely independent, and so the columns of u are linearly independent. Hence the
square matrix u  ∈ R(+1)×(+1) is invertible, whence (u u)−1u u = u. To see
why the mapping u 7→ u = (u u)−1u u on U is continuous, note that it is the
composition of various continuous functions and operations: u 7→ u is continuous by
Claim 1, u 7→ u is continuous, and the operations of matrix transposition, matrix
inversion and matrix multiplication are continuous. As u 7→ (u) is a subfunction of
the continuous function u 7→ u, it is itself continuous. Q.e.d.
Claim 3 : The mapping u 7→ (u) from U to R is continuous.
If || = 1, then u 7→ (u) is constant, hence continuous. Now assume || 6= 1, and
let u → u in U . Fix  ∈  . We show u → u. Pick distinct  0 ∈ . Let (º )
( = 1 2    ) and (º) be the profiles in D with values profiles u and u, respectively,




for  6=  () = 13 and (0) = 23 . By Lemma 5 and the fact that u → u, we have
(º )→ (º). So, by continuity of  , º→ º, whence by Lemma 5 º → º. So, as































it follows that 2
2
u
−1 → 22u−1. So, u → u. ¥
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B.4 Proof of Fact 4
Suppose  is linear-geometric with values-dependent weights, say w.r.t. weights (u u)∈u∈U .
I prove the three axioms.
Claim 1 :  is dynamically rational.
Assume (º0) ∈ D arises from (º) ∈ D by conditionalising all preferences on  ⊆ ,
i.e., º0 = º for all . We must show that º0 = º. Note that (º0) = ( º) and
that (º0) arises from (º) by conditionalising all beliefs on , i.e., º() 6= 0 and
º0 = º(·|) for all  (no º() is zero because otherwise some º0 = º would
be the all-indifferent relation, hence would lie outside P, contradicting that (º0) ∈ D).
To show that º0 = º, we need to prove that º0 = º (= º ) and that º0 is
the conditionalisation of º on  (i.e., that º() 6= 0 and º0 = º(·|)). First,
º = º0 because (º0) = ( º), and because º =
P
 uº and º0 =
P
 uº0 ,
where u := (º) = (º0). Second, º0 is the conditionalisation of º on  because
º0 = ((º)) and º = ((º)) where  is a geometric opinion pooling rule (the
one with weights u,  ∈ ), and because geometric opinion pooling is dynamically
rational by Theorem 2, proved in Appendix A. Q.e.d.
Claim 2 :  is minimally Paretian.






 u =  where u := (º). So, whenever acts   satisfy  ∼ 
for all  ∈  , then  ∼  because
Eº(º())− Eº(º()) = E
⎛⎝X

u(º()− º()| {z }
=0
)
⎞⎠ = 0 Q.e.d.
Claim 3 :  is continuous.
We assume (º ) → (º) in D and show º→ º. For all  ∈  , º → º and
º → º by Lemma 5. Hence (º )→ (º ), and thus by continuity of the weights
(º

) → (º ) and (º






















Hence º → º and º → º by definition of  . So º→ º by Lemma 5. ¥
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